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1 Discussion about black suffrage in the US began in earnest on April 11, 1865. Two days
after General Robert E. Lee had surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia, and with
the end of the Civil War in sight, Abraham Lincoln came to the window of the White
House to give what turned out to be his last speech. He laid out his vision for the post-
war nation and proposed giving some Blacks, especially those who had fought in the
war, the right to vote. It was the first time an American president endorsed publicly
even limited black suffrage (Foner, 2010, 331). John Wilkes Booth was supposedly part
of  the  crowd.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  Civil  War  and  Lincoln’s  assassination,  the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution were adopted.
In  1869,  during  the  congressional  debate  over  the  Fifteenth  Amendment,  Senator
Waitman T. Willey, a Republican from West Virginia, proclaimed from the Senate Floor:
This  Amendment,  when  adopted,  will  settle  the  question  for  all  time  of  negro
suffrage  in  the  insurgent  States,  where  it  has lately  been  extended  under  the
pressure of congressional legislation, and will preclude the possibility of any future
denial of this privilege by any change in the constitutions of those states (cited by
Epstein & Walker, 2007, 749). 
2 Quite an optimistic prediction. And he wasn’t the only one ready to put the matter to
rest. After the Fifteenth Amendment was passed, a New York Times’ editorial asserted
that the amendment would “put an end to further agitation on the subject” (Keyssar,
2000, 103). In retrospect it couldn’t have been further away from the truth. Although
ratification meant that states were constitutionally prohibited from engaging in racial
discrimination, Southern states prevented blacks from voting as soon as the policies of
Reconstruction ended. These actions aimed at limiting Black suffrage were numerous:
white-only voting in Democratic Party primaries, poll taxes, literacy and understanding
tests,  difficult  registration  requirements  and  intimidation.  These  tactics  were  so
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efficient that black participation at the ballot box in the South was negligible well into
the 1950s.
3 Beginning in the 1960s the federal government tried to take action to address racial
discrimination at the polls. For a while all three branches of government seemed to
work in unison. Congress passed legislation to enforce voting rights and remove legal
barriers  to  the  ballot  box.  The  executive  branch sued state  governments  and local
officials  that  deprived  African-Americans  of  their  voting  rights.  And  the  judiciary
stepped into the political thicket. For instance, in 1965, in Louisiana v. United States, the
Supreme  Court  struck  down  Louisiana’s  “understanding  test”  which  allowed  local
voting registrars to decide whether individuals attempting to register had a sufficient
understanding of state and federal constitutions to be qualified to vote. But judicial
rulings alone were not sufficient to bring about major change, particularly with respect
to  voting participation among minorities.  Too many alternative  measures,  many of
them  informal  or  indirect,  were  available  to  block  or  delay  the  exercise  of  the
franchise.  Statistics  showed that  congress  strategy  of  passing  legislation  to  expand
opportunities for taking civil rights claims to court had been ineffective. Registration
numbers in southern states show that victories in court do not necessarily translate
into social change1.
4 A more aggressive  policy  was  required.  The Voting Rights  Act  of  1965,  enacted on
August  6,  1965,  one  hundred  years  after  Lincoln’s  last  speech,  came  after  three
attempts to facilitate black registration. The Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960 and 1964
had  only  produced  modest  improvements  in  black  registration  rates  in  the  South.
President  Johnson  directed  his  attorney  General,  Nicolas  Kazenbach,  to  draft  “the
goddamnedest toughest voting rights law you can devise” (May, 2013). And the VRA
was no ordinary piece of legislation. People had died for it. Americans had fought all
over  the  country  on bridges,  in  churches,  in  their  homes.  They  had to  face  police
brutality, attack dogs and firebombs to give life to the Fifteenth Amendment. The law
bitterly  divided  the  nation  and  it  is  written  in  the  US  Code  with  blood  and
tears.Understanding  that  the  redemption  of  the  American  democracy  was  at  stake
Lyndon Johnson pleaded before Congress : “And should we defeat every enemy, should
we double our wealth and conquer the stars, and still be unequal to this issue, then we
will have failed as a people and as a nation”2.
5 The VRA was a groundbreaking law in the sense that it granted the federal government
unilateral  power  to  intervene  in  election  administration  of  state  and  local
governments.  The  right  to  organize  its  own  elections  is  one  cornerstone  of  state
sovereignty and Section 5 has been viewed since its implementation as one of the most
important exceptions to American federalism. Opponents argue that it does not only
violate the sovereignty of the states but its application is discriminatory since it is not
applied to all the states. For conservatives, Congress exceeded its powers in 1965. The
VRA  advocates  have  long  established  that  a  reform  of  the  states  of  the  former
Confederacy could not happen without a strong continued response from the federal
government.
6 This  made  the  VRA  one  of  the  most  effective  desegregation  policies  in  the  era
(Davidson & Grofman, 1994). The VRA was enacted as a 5-year temporary legislation,
and was enacted through the bipartisan support of non-Southern members of Congress.
As  soon as  1966 its  constitutionality  was  questioned in  6  states  in  South  Carolina  v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). In this case the Supreme Court found Section 5 and 4(b)
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to  be  valid  exercises  of  the  power  of  Congress  under  section  2  of  the  Fifteenth
Amendment. 
7 One  important  feature  of  the  VRA  is  that  it  banned  literacy  tests  and  put  tough
restrictions on poll taxes in state elections. In 1966, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections,  the Supreme Court found that poll  taxes imposed as vote requirement in
state elections violated the Fourteenth amendment. Specifically, even after the passage
of the 24th Amendment in 1964 banning poll taxes, some Southern states continued to
implement the poll tax until the Supreme Court struck it down in 1966. To cope with
their  noncompliance,  Section  10  of  the  VRA  enabled  the  Attorney  General  to
“institute,” or challenge, the use of poll taxes, thus effectively restricting its use. An
abundance  of  studies  shows  that  these  institutional  barriers  suppressed  minority
voting (Alt 1994; Filer, Kenny and Morton 1991; Key 1949). Another important feature
of the VRA is that it designated a state or county government as a covered jurisdiction
if it implemented any discriminatory test or device, or if the voting registration rate or
voting turnout in the presidential election of 1964 among the voting population was
lower  than  50%.  The  1965  VRA  designated  the  entire  states  of  Alabama,  Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and the Commonwealth of Virginia as well as 40
out of 100 counties in North Carolina as covered jurisdictions. Once designated, covered
jurisdictions needed preclearance from the federal government for any change in rules
that  could  affect  public  elections.  Moreover,  on  the  request  of  residents,  federal
officials can review the voter registration process and monitor the elections in covered
jurisdictions. Thus, the VRA severely limited the ability of southern governments to
discourage minority representation. African-American voter registration rates among
VRA-covered states rose from 27.9% before the VRA to 54.7% after it passed (Rosenberg
2008).  Then,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  southern  governments  expected  that
minority voters would start affecting policy making in the near future, they therefore
started to look for new ways to make this vote less meaningful.
8 The duration and scope of the law on the right to vote was extended by Congress in
1970, 1975 and 19823. Since 1975, under pressure from the Chicano movement, the law
on electoral rights was extended to linguistic minorities. Section 4 now covered states
and  counties  that  had  at  least  5%  of  their  voting  age  population  belonging  to  a
linguistic minority, namely: “Indians” and “People from Alaska,” “Asians” and “persons
of Spanish origin.”4 If the ballots of those jurisdictions were in English and there were
no translators (especially for languages  that are oral) then the elections are considered
discriminatory. Congress in 1975 extended the VRA for an additional seven years and
the law of electoral rights beyond the Fifteenth Amendment (racial discrimination in
elections)  and  the  South  (it  now  covered  much  of  the  Southwest  and  West  of  the
country). In fact, the protection of linguistic minorities appears to be an extension of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. 
9 In 1980, the Supreme Court stated that the drawing of an electoral district was illegal if
it  limited  the  voting  power  of  a  minority  intentionally5.  But,  given  the  practical
difficulties of proving intent to minimize minority voting from indirect factors such as
the shape of a district, Congress in 1982, extended the VRA for another 25 years and
showed his disagreement with the decision in Bolden and amended section 2. This was
key moment since Section 2, in its original version, dealt only with election procedures
aimed  at  minimizing  the  impact  of  the  minority  vote.  Now  demonstrating  a
disproportionate effect was sufficient to justify invalidation. The result of the test of
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“totality  of  the  circumstances”6,  if  not  enough  to  invalidate  an  election  procedure
under the Constitution, including the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, becomes
sufficient to invalidate in light of Section 2 as amended in 1982.7 
10 This  amendment  was  accused  of  forcing  the  courts  to  move  towards  proportional
representation of non-white minorities. Thus, we are witnessing a transformation of
the  rights  guaranteed  by  the  VRA.  This  text,  which  initially  guaranteed  rights  for
Blacks to register as voters and to vote, quickly was used to tackle second-generation
discrimination and thereby solve a different but related problem: the dilution of the
impact of the vote of minorities. The issue is no longer outright deprivation of the right
to vote, but the dilution of the impact of this vote.8
11 The issue of electoral equality is further complicated by the confluence of the ethno-
racial affiliation and party affiliation in the United States. That is why Jesse Rhodes’
analysis of partisan regimes and institutional changes is so crucial to understand how
strange and ironic the career of the Voting Rights Act has actually been (Kousser, 2008)
but also to place the debate about voting rights in its wider political context. Over the
course of 50 years, the Democratic partisan regime coalesced around minority voting
rights  while  the  Republican  partisan  regime rejected  the  advancement  of  minority
voting rights, instrumentalized this racial divide for partisan gains and when thwarted
legislatively turned to the judicial branch to advance its agenda. 
12 One of the reasons why such “competing racial orders” (Smith & King, 2011) aligned
with  partisan  interest  is  because  the  issue  of  political  representation  of  non-white
minorities  is  inseparable  from  its  partisan  effects.  Because  of  the  ethno-racial
polarization  of  the  vote,  this  standard  impacts  partisan  balance  since  racial  and
partisan affiliations have become “two sides of the same coin.”(Cain, 2013, 338)Given
the level of ethno-racial polarization of the vote in the US and since the Republican
electorate is overwhelmingly white, the creation of majority minority districts actually
guarantees the election of a Hispanic or an African-American, but also a Democrat. So
progressives seem to have a partisan interest when they defend the right of minorities
to  exercise  “undiluted”  voting  rights.  However,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.
Redistricting is a zero-sum game. A predominantly Democratic district has the effect of
making  the  adjacent  districts  predominantly  Republican.  Therefore  Republicans,  as
part of their Southern Strategy, encouraged creating a handful of majority minority
districts in order to secure the domination of the conservative party in other districts.
That is why some scholars focus on substantive representation of minority interests,
while other scholars emphasize descriptive representation (Guinier, 1991; Swain, 1993;
Cameron, Epstein, O’Halloran; Tate, 2001; James, 2011). The absence of any discussion of
racial  polarization  in  the  recent  Supreme  Court  jurisprudence  is,  in  the  words  of
Richard Engstrom, the “elepant in the room”. In his article professor Engstrom shows
that the absence of such central topic when dealing with voting rights is an indictment
of justice’s Robert’s sincere commitment to racial equality. All the data accumulated by
political scientists indicate that the level of polarization is such that ignoring it and
asserting  that  the  conditions  in  the  South  have  changed  is  nothing  more  than
incantation.
13 During the 1990s and 2000s the inter-branch dialogue over the VRA continued. Since
the 1990s, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority jurisprudence has shifted from
the question of the validity of  procedures diluting the minority vote to that of  the
validity of  procedures increasing the impact of  the minority vote.  In Reno v.  Bossier
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Parish School Board, 520 US 471 (1997) the Supreme Court stated that the Department of
Justice  cannot,  by virtue  of  the  powers  conferred  by  Section  5,  object  to  electoral
change for the simple reason that it appeared to violate Section 2. If such a change did
not violate “regression” criterion, the Department of Justice had to validate it. It was
considered by the Court as an abusive incorporation of Section 2 into Section 5. In a
second case, Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board 528 US 320 (2000) or Bossier II, the Court
held that Section 5 did not allow federal authorities to oppose redistricting plans that
would reflect a discriminatory intent if they did not result in a reduction of the impact
of the minority vote, that is to say, the number of districts they “control”. However,
legislatures were stuck between a rock and hard place. Indeed, if a State drew majority
minority districts, it could fall within the perview of Section 2 of the VRA under the
Gingles jurisprudence.  If  it  created them, it  could fall  under the scope of  the Equal
Protection Clause of  the Fourteenth Amendment following the Shawv.  Reno 509 U.S.
630(1993) and Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900(1995) jurisprudence.
14 In  2003,  in  the  case  Georgia  v.  Ashcroft 539  US  461  (2003),  the  Supreme  Court
reinterpreted  the  “regression”  standard  of  Section  5.  Before  Georgia  v.  Ashcroft the
analysis  of  the  courts  was  that,  according  to  the  Beer jurisprudence,  “regression”
happened when the number of majority minority districts was reduced, or when the
percentage of  the  minority  population in  these  districts  was  reduced significantly.9
However, Georgia v. Ashcroft established that these measures were acceptable if, under
the totality of circumstances standard, the legislature continued to draw districts to
ensure  that  minority  groups  could  significantly  influence  the  election  without
“controlling” it. Yet, this decision did not specify exactly what constituted an influence
district (Engstrom, 2010).
15 In 2006, supporters of renewal of the VRA insisted on adding amendments to “correct”
the Bossier  II and Ashcroft jurisprudence as they had done in 1982 facing the Bolden
jurisprudence. According to them, the Supreme Court went against the will of Congress
and  its  decision  was  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  law.  Their  opponents  obviously
refused to support these changes but offered other amendments aiming at weakening
Section  5  and  Section  203.  In  the  end  the  VRA  as  amended  by  Congress  in  2006
invalidated the Bossier II jurisprudence that allowed discriminatory redistricting plans
if they did not have a regressive purpose. It stated that it was not legal to validate a
redistricting plan if it had either a regressive purpose or a discriminatory purpose. The
VRA also invalidated the Aschroft jurisprudence that allowed a minority to influence the
election  of  a  white  candidate,  but  did  not  guarantee  the  election  of  the  candidate
preferred by a non-white minority. According the new text the purpose of Section 5
was to protect the ability of minority citizens to “elect the candidate of their choice.” 
16 Since 1982, the Court had narrowed its view of Congress’s power to enforce the post-
Civil  War amendments which are the constitutional  basis  for Section 5 of  the VRA.
Therefore  Congress  amassed  a  huge  factual  record  and  held  extensive  hearings  to
determine whether it should once again reauthorize the VRA preclearance formula and
rule. Congress reauthorized the VRA for another 25 years.
17 The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision to strike down a key component of the 1965
VRA  closes  one  of  the  most  successful  chapters  in  the  history  of  civil  rights
enforcement. “Our country has changed,” Chief Justice Roberts opined for the majority,
“and while any
racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the
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legislation  it  passes  to  remedy  that  problem  speaks  to  current  conditions.”
Significantly, the Shelby County decision deemed the Section 4 coverage formula invalid,
but did not strike down Section 5. Presumably, if Congress passed a coverage formula
tailored  to  current  conditions,  Section  5  remains  a  viable  enforcement  provision.
However the facts seem to contradict Justice Roberts. Thanks to the most extensive
database on the Voting Rights Act accumulated over several decades, Morgan Kousser
demonstrates in his thorough analysis that Section 5 was a remedy that actually spoke
to the current conditions. And that if the Court had looked hard enough at the evidence
it might have opted to defer to Congress. 
18 Alas, the Court was on a different path. The Shelby decision was not a surprise since
scholars had indicated for a long time that Section 5, as worded, was problematic for a
conservative court (Issacharoff, 2004; Hasen, 2005). In addition, in 2009, in Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 557 US 193, 2009 (NAMUDNO), in a
majority opinion also written by John Roberts, the Supreme Court had suggested that
Section  5  seemed  constitutionally  suspect  and  it  encouraged  Congress  to  revise  it.
However,  neither  NAMUNDO nor  Shelby addressed  the  central  question  of  the
constitutionality of Section 5. And yet for all instance and purposes Section 5 is dead.
Professors Brunell and Manzo, in their article, explain why Section 5 is still necessary
and  propose  alternative  methods  to  protect  minority  voting  rights  through
administrative  notification  while  Congress  struggles  with  enacting  a  new  formula.
Laughlin McDonald, special counsel and director emeritus of the Voting Rights Project
of the American Civil Liberties Union, reviews in his article the different steps (or lack
thereof) that Congress has taken since the Shelby decision and proposes other ways to
compensate for the absence of preclearance by for instance strengthening Section 2
and Section 3.
19 Since the ruling, several states once covered under preclearance have passed voter ID
laws that removed provisions such as online voting registration, early voting, “Souls to
the Polls” Sunday voting, same-day registration, and pre-registration for teens about to
turn 18, which had expanded means of voter registration. The scope of the racial and
partisan impact of these measures is difficult to evaluate so far. However, restriction of
the right to vote, rather than expansion, is never a good sign in a democracy. Rogers M.
Smith and Desmond King, in their article, explain that the future of American politics is
rather bleak on the voting rights front. As long as the conservative movement sees
voting rights  suppression as  a  partisan tool,  racial  policy  alliances  will  continue to
structure American politics and American elections and governance might be paralyzed
by the voting wars (Hasen 2012).
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NOTES
1. For example, between 1956 and 1965 black voter registration in Louisiana was stable (31.7% to
31.8%). In Mississippi between 1954 and 1964 black registration rose from 4.4% to a meager 6.4%.
DOJ figures quoted in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), Justice Warren’s opinion at
313.
2. Lyndon  B.  Johnson,  Speech  Before  Congress  on  Voting  Rights  (March  15,  1965),  http://
millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3386
3. These three extensions were validated by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S.
526 (1973), City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, (1980), Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266,
(1999).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(e).
5. Mobile  v.  Bolden  446 U.S.  55  (1980)  justice  Stewart’s  opinion,  joined by justices  Powell  and
Rehnquist, p. 62.
6. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary issued a report to accompany the 1982 legislation. In
that report, it suggested several factors for courts to consider when determining if, within the
totality  of  the  circumstances  in  a  jurisdiction,  the  operation  of  the  electoral  device  being
challenged results in a violation of Section 2. These factors include:
the history of official voting-related discrimination in the state or political subdivision;
the  extent  to  which  voting  in  the  elections  of  the  state  or  political  subdivision  is  racially
polarized;
the extent to which the state of political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that
tend  to  enhance  the  opportunity  for  discrimination  against  the  minority  group,  such  as
unusually large election districts,  majority-vote requirements,  and prohibitions against bullet
voting;
the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes;
the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as
education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process;
the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and
the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction.S.Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), pages 28-29.
7. Voting Rights Act, Section 2(b). Italics added by author.
8. This dilution can occur in numerically equal districts and in the absence of any inequality in
access to the ballot box or any election fraud.
9. Since the concept of vote dilution was accepted by the court in the case Allen v. State Board of
Elections,  393  US  544  (1969),  court  decisions  tend  to  invalidate,  under  Section  5,  election
procedures which have the effect to dilute the vote of ethno-racial minorities in comparison to a
previous situation, consistent with the "non-regression" standard as defined in the decision Beer
v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
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